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Intentional Features of Consciousness in Phenomenology and 
Shingon Buddhism 
Angelique Coralie Kendall 
Fundamental commitments in Western Phenomenology rest on the assumption that 
subjectivity and intentionality are unassailable features of conscious experience. The dyadic, 
subject-object structure of experience that results, is thus a necessary condition for conscious 
awareness. In sharp contrast, Buddhist thought emphasises the fundamental error of 
subjective and intentional modes of awareness, emphasising instead non-dyadic conscious 
states. In the Japanese Shingon Buddhist philosophy of Kūkai, such non-dyadic awareness is 
metaphysically construed as the ontological horizon of the field of consciousness-as-such, 
interpenetrating all phenomena. The embodied state is highlighted as the means through 
which such awareness is realised. This paper explores these two perspectives with two 
questions in mind: how can an enlightened person experience non-dyadic states, and how can 
they act in the world without subjective agency? 
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Western Phenomenology gives a rich account of the subject / object, or dyadic structure of 
conscious experience, but does not develop the possibility of non-dyadic conscious states 
since its commitments to subjectivity and intentionality obviate that possibility. Buddhist 
thought holds the view that enlightened consciousness is non-dyadic, and that dyadic 
conscious states and the subjectivity necessary to them are fundamentally mistaken. In this 
paper I explore the tension between these views with two questions in mind; how can the 
enlightened person experience non-dyadic states, and how can they act in the world without 
subjective agency? I will argue that if the Buddhist view of non-dyadic consciousness is 
dependent upon its metaphysical commitments, which includes a conception of 
consciousness as an ontological horizon of experience, then subjectivity and intentionality 
are not necessary for a state to be conscious just so long as the non-dyadic state is 
authentic. 1  Since the metaphysical commitments rest upon the doctrine of the 
interpenetration of embodiment and consciousness, an enlightened person can enact their 
agency in their dyadic capacity, whilst simultaneously experiencing non-dyadic conscious 
awareness. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I am using the term ‘Authenticity’ in this context to denote a particular type of non-dyadic non-spatiotemporal conscious state. 
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1. Phenomenology and the Relational Feature of Consciousness 
The philosophical discipline of phenomenology sets about investigating the nature of 
phenomena as they appear to, and are experienced by, the first-person subjective 
consciousness.2 Husserl, the father of the discipline, distinguishes between two modes of 
experience; the subjective mode is the intentional process of consciousness in its act of 
perceiving (noesis), and the objective mode, which is that which is grasped in any given act of 
perception (noema). 3  An essential feature of consciousness in this view then, is its 
intentionality, which is precisely its capacity to orientate towards the objects of its 
perception, to be concerned with them, or to be about them.4 Noesis is directed towards 
noema in such a way that it bestows meaning to it,5 irrespective of the actual ontological 
status of the object perceived.6 For Husserl, we can bracket the question of the existence of 
the object qua object in order to better inquire into the structure of the subjective 
experience of the object-as-meant, or as intentioned.7 This subjective aspect is, for Jean-Paul 
Sartre, the very means by which states are conscious at all.8 He says that “Every conscious 
existence exists as consciousness of existing,” 9  which entails that consciousness is 
indistinguishable from self-consciousness.  
Self-consciousness is accounted for by either, the Reflectionist thesis, which posits a 
higher-order awareness taking the-act-of-being-aware as its object of awareness, or the 
Reflexivist thesis, which posits an innate awareness-of-oneself-as-being-aware that is 
coextensive with the act of awareness itself. I find the Reflectionist thesis unsatisfactory on 
two counts; firstly, because positing a higher-order awareness as itself conscious, requires an 
even higher-order consciousness to account for it and so on, leading to an infinite regress, 
and secondly, because positing a higher-order awareness as non-conscious raises concerns 
as to how that which is non-conscious is capable of revealing consciousness at all. Higher-
order theories run into difficulties in either case of it’s being conscious or non-conscious. 
Phenomenologist’s hold the Reflexivist thesis and maintain that consciousness simply is self-
consciousness. 
For Sartre however, this self-consciousness is revealed only in relation to that object 
of which it is conscious. It is thus positional with regard to the object, and in reaching for it; it 
not only transcends itself but also exhausts itself.10 Sartre says that there can be no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Smith, David Woodruff, "Phenomenology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/phenomenology/>. (accessed October 17, 2016). 
3 David Edward Shaner, The Bodymind Experience in Japanese Buddhism (New York: State university of New York press, 1985), 15. 
4 Ibid. 
5 David Edward Shaner, The Bodymind Experience in Japanese Buddhism, 15. 
6 Jay L. Garfield, Engaging Buddhism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 175. 
7 Smith. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1943), 13. 
10 Ibid., 11. 
3 
 
consciousness without this intentionally directed conscious act.11 This makes the intentional 
act a necessary condition of conscious states, as Sartre says, “for consciousness there is no 
being except for this precise obligation to be a revealing intuition of something.”12   
Positional consciousness is, however, just one aspect of what Sartre refers to as a 
full-blown act of consciousness, the other aspect being non-positional consciousness. This is 
the implicit my-ness of an experience, or the passive awareness of a state as being something 
to me, otherwise referred to as the non-dyadic self-acquaintance, or the “mode of 
apprehension” of something.13 For Sartre, the positional and non-positional aspects of 
consciousness are both necessary, and together they are sufficient for consciousness. “Every 
full-blown act of consciousness” he says, “is intentional – that is, it constitutively involved a 
positional aspect – and it is reflexive in that it constitutively involves a non-positional aspect. 
Indeed, each aspect is impossible without the other.”14 Focusing on one’s awareness of the 
state of being aware is only possible with the involvement of a pre-reflective non-positional 
awareness that enables its occurrence. It is this pre-reflective awareness that Sarte states is 
minimal self-awareness,15 and it is from self-awareness that subjective experience relates to 
the objects it encounters.  
 
2. Relational Features of Experience in the Phenomenology of Time 
Not only are our conscious states relational then, with regard to their objects of 
perception, they are also relational relative to the temporal past and future. For Husserl the 
temporal structure of conscious experience contains both a retentional aspect to the past 
state from whence it has arisen, and a protentional aspect to the future state that it 
anticipates.16 These two states are mediated by the temporal present which Husserl terms 
the primal impression. It is precisely through the capacity that pre-reflective self-awareness 
has in being aware of an experience as ongoing, that time appears to have seamless 
continuity. 17  This is necessarily mediated by pre-reflective self-consciousness and not 
reflective consciousness, since there is a delay between directly perceived experiences and 
the attempt to cognise them, 18  resulting in part of our lived experience remaining 
undisclosed to us.  
For Sartre, pre-reflective consciousness is negated in the reflective act turned back 
upon itself. This is due to the dynamic nature of consciousness, which can only ever grasp its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., xxvii 
13 Ibid., 18. 
14 Matthew D. MacKenzie, “The Illuminations of Consciousness: Approaches to Self-Awareness in the Indian and Western 
Traditions,” Philosophy East and West 57, no. 1 (January 2007), 50. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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temporally prior act, since its current state is the very act of reflection with which it attempts 
to reflect back. Sartre thinks that this amounts to a double objectification and results in 
consciousness dividing itself from itself, causing the loss of its I-ness, (or subjectivity), and 
resulting ultimately in self-annihilation.19 Since Sartre identifies consciousness with dyadic 
subject-object relations, the loss of a subject is also the loss of consciousness.  
For Heidegger, the human being or Dasein (being there), is a relational being that has a 
sense of “what one is at any moment and what one will be at the temporally extended 
unfolding of life into a realm of possibilities.”20 That one stands at the threshold of this as yet 
unrealised potentiality is of paramount importance for Heidegger, since our projections into 
the future are the means whereby we concern ourselves with our ultimate possibilities, and 
from that, construct our identity and furnish our current experiences with purpose. The 
relational aspect of existence is, on this view, a fundamental feature of not only conscious 
experience, but of existence itself.21 Heidegger emphasises that “we find ourselves thrown 
into a world and a situation not of our own making”, with our current prospects being 
constrained by our past experiences. The relational sense of our lived experience is between 
our being-in-a-situation and our striving or anticipatory running-forward toward the type of 
existence we aspire to.22 
 
3. Relational Features of Personal and Social Bodies in the Phenomenology of 
Space 
Relational features of conscious experience also extend into the realm of space, since 
our existence is not isolated from the environment in which we find ourselves; we are 
necessarily situated in the world through the fact of our embodiment. Pre-reflective self-
consciousness has a bodily component that accompanies every experience and situates it in 
the spatial realm in which we exist.23 The first-person orientation realised through our 
embodiment “concerns not simply location and posture, but action in pragmatic contexts and 
interaction with other people.”24 It is through the body that we may enact our agency in the 
world; through the tacit knowledge of our capabilities and limitations we may form realistic 
volitions, and through mobility we may explore our environment and engage with the worldly 
experiences that we encounter.25  
Bodily existence, as a point of origin in relation to the world, enables conscious 
experience to have an enacted spatial dimension. Bodily self-awareness then, just by virtue of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ibid., 51, 52 
20 Varga, Somogy and Guignon, Charles, "Authenticity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/authenticity/>. Accessed 15 / 11 / 15 
21Ibid 
22 Ibid 
23 Gallagher, Shaun and Zahavi, Dan, "Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness" 
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid 
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its extension in space, necessarily involves intentional activity. This is posited not only in 
relation to the world, but also in relation to the other embodied beings that one encounters 
in the world. It is through this that embodied beings find themselves enacting their agency in 
a public sphere of activity. Being part of a network of inter-subjective inter-relational 
exchanges with other sentient beings serves to, not only bind groups of subjects into social 
bodies that act in solidarity with common goals and intentions, but also to sever relations 
based upon disparate aims and concerns. Furthermore, the observation by others of my 
activities also affords me the opportunity for self-reflection, and if necessary, enables a 
modification of behaviour. For Husserl, “I become aware of myself specifically as a human 
person only in such intersubjective relations.”26  
 
4. Subjectivity as an Authentic Point of Origin of Relational Experience 
The experience of myself as an object of some other persons perception, greatly 
influences my behaviour, and by extension, the conceptual parameters with which I frame my 
experiences. For, Heidegger, if we blindly conform to pre-established norms and live our lives 
in a kind of “average everydayness”, we run the risk of “falling” out of authorship with our 
own existence in what becomes an inauthentic lived experience.27 We fail to attain our full 
capacity since the purposive orientation of our intentional agency, is directed by impersonal 
agents in the world; the others we encounter. Dasein in its inauthenticity is self-alienated.28  
In order to correct our destabilised orientation, we need to undergo a personal 
transformation that, for Heidegger, has three stages. Firstly, we experience anxiety fuelled by 
the unsettling collapse of our familiar world through a realisation of its lack of significance, 
which highlights our utterly isolated but steadfast individuality.29 Secondly, we face up to our 
mortality by confronting the ultimate termination of all of our future-orientated concerns in 
death, which lends urgency to our actualizing them in the present. Thirdly, we must heed our 
call of conscience, which reinforces the debt we have to own our lives responsibly. We must 
move from a state of disowning our agency, through an unowned phase, into owning 
ourselves such that “we are obliged to take up the task of living with resoluteness and full 
engagement.”30 Authenticity is thus an executive virtue that enables ones agency in the world, 
and subjectivity, which is securely situated in the body, is the point of origin from whence all 
relations arise and around which they are posited.  
The phenomenological understanding of consciousness, as has been shown, is 
necessarily dyadic, that is, it consists of a subject / object distinction within a relational 
structure. Subjectivity is the point of origin for not only self-awareness but also for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid 
28 Ibid 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
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awareness of time. It is through embodiment that subjectivity is a point of origin for enacting 
agency in spatial environments and for engaging in inter-subjective social domains. 
Furthermore, being securely situated in one’s subjectivity is vital to an authentic lived 
experience.   
Buddhist notions of consciousness however, differ in two important regards. Firstly 
Buddhists maintain that there is no-self, as a subject or owner of experiences that endures 
through time. Secondly, Buddhists maintain that the ultimate nature of reality, as directly 
experienced in a state of enlightenment, is non-dyadic. Since a minimal sense of subjectivity 
is deemed necessary for conscious awareness on the phenomenological account, questions 
arise as to whether an enlightened person can actually experience non-dual states on the one 
hand, and if they can act in the world without the agency that subjectivity entails on the 
other.  
These questions however, are based upon a presupposition that the 
phenomenological account of subjectivity and the intentional structure of consciousness is 
correct. Western phenomenologists have themselves presupposed that subjectivity is an 
unassailable feature of conscious experience, as is the dyadic relational structure that follows 
from it. The Buddhist view presents a challenge to this presupposition by offering an 
alternative account of consciousness that is non-dyadic. Since it gives a critical account of the 
dyadic structure of experience and offers a rich account of non-dual awareness, it is 
important that we take these perspectives into consideration in our investigation into the 
nature of consciousness.  
 
5. Some Fundamental Features of Buddhist Thought 
Buddhists are committed to both the doctrine of impermanence, according to which 
all things are in a state of flux and nothing is exempt from perpetual change, and the 
doctrine of dependent origination which states that all things arise dependant upon prior 
causes and conditions, (with each arising particular acting as a cause or condition to newly 
arising particulars). 31  This commitment entails that nothing can be construed as 
independently existing and nothing has ultimate nature or intrinsic essence, since the very 
notion of essence entails both permanence and independence.  
The human condition is characterised by dukkha (suffering). At the most surface level 
it is the suffering of the pain and disease experienced by a human being within their lifetime. 
At a more subtle level it is the suffering of the impermanence of that which we come to hold 
dear. At the most subtle level it is the suffering due to the conditions and causes which lead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Bina Gupta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy: Perspectives on Reality, Knowledge and Freedom (New York: Routledge, 2012), 
92. 
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to birth, and death and rebirth and re-death. 32  The perpetual cycle of existence, 
characterised as it is by impermanence and suffering, is Saṃsāra, and the cause of this 
suffering is due to our fundamental ignorance of the true nature of reality exasperated by 
the desire and craving which compels us to grasp for ultimate essence and permanence. 
These compulsions generate volitions and actions, which set into motion the karma that 
informs this, and future existences. In this way we generate the cyclic perpetuity of Saṃsāra 
over multiple lifetimes, which, without liberation, is without end.33  
Nirvāṇa then, is the liberation from this suffering due to the realisation and 
rectification of our fundamental ignorance. Accordingly, volitions and karma are no longer 
generated, resulting in an ultimate liberation from the cycle of Saṃsāra into an enlightened 
state, which is the ‘extinction’ or the cessation of ignorance and suffering.34 Coming to realise 
that our fundamental ignorance in ascribing an essential self and permanence to no-self, 
and that the state of impermanence is the cause and perpetuation of our suffering, the 
cessation of that suffering requires a radical change of perspective as regards the reality we 
perceive. Nirvāṇa then, is the ultimate truth that liberates one from the deception of Saṃsāra, 
and the rich debate between various Buddhists schools aim to illuminate the true nature of 
that ultimate truth. 
 
6. Buddhist Conceptions of Consciousness 
Overcoming the error of our misapprehension of reality is, for the Buddhists, a 
process of coming to control the mind through the focusing of one’s attention on the inner 
mental phenomena that underlie our relational experiences.35 It is important to note that 
consciousness, for Buddhist philosophers, does not denote a single mental state. It is rather 
an unfolding of developing degree’s or levels, in a seamless continuum from the most 
apparent surface and sensory realms to the deeper underlying substrate of experience.36  
Mahāyāna Buddhism says that the first five levels of consciousness are various 
aspects of sensory awareness; eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousness.37 The sixth 
level is consciousness itself in its intentional aspect; it is the means by which relational 
cognition occurs. The seventh level then, is the ego-consciousness which is the level of 
perceiving ones individual nature as an enduring self.38 Beneath this is the eighth level 
storehouse consciousness, which has the nature, according to the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, of being 
like the ocean, with conscious episodes upon its surface like waves.39  The storehouse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Mark Siderits, Buddhism as Philosophy, 20.  
33 Ibid., 22. 
34 Ibid., pg 28 
35 Donald W. Mitchell and Sarah H. Jacoby, Buddhism, Third edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 124. 
36 Garfield, 131. 
37 Ibid. 90. 
38 Ibid 
39 Mitchell and Jacoby, 126. 
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consciousness functions as the substratum of the mind with a repository of karmic seeds 
from past actions that germinate to cause newly arising conditions. In Phenomenological 
terminology, this is pre-reflective consciousness presenting as the foundational ground of 
experience.40 For the Mahāyāna philosophers, especially for the Yogācāra Buddhists, the 
deepest level of consciousness responsible for giving rise to the appearance of subjectivity in 
the seventh level is the storehouse-consciousness.  
Later developments in the East Asian Mahāyāna lineage postulate even deeper levels 
of consciousness. Japanese Shingon Buddhist philosopher Kūkai maintains that the ultimate 
state of non-dual awareness is realised in the tenth and deepest level of consciousness.41 
Kūkai’s view is that the storehouse consciousness is divided into a shallower, afflicted aspect, 
that clings to its own constructions and gives rise to unsavoury karmic conditions, and a 
deeper unafflicted aspect that is free of attachment and delusion and gives rise to purer 
experiences.42 This deeper ninth level aspect of the storehouse consciousness is also referred 
to as the unstained consciousness, suchness consciousness or true consciousness.43 Kūkai 
finds this ninth level to be the highest exoteric level since it is “mind utterly without any 
nature of its own.” It emphasises “the interpenetration of all phenomena as a substanceless 
flux,”44 and is the realisation of “the field of many-as-one and one-as-many.”45  
 
7. Indra’s Net : A Buddhist Metaphysics of Interpenetration 
Kūkai’s views on consciousness are built upon a complex and rigorous metaphysical 
framework that is the culmination of a long lineage of philosophical speculation. The debate 
begins with the Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine of emptiness, which places emphasis on the 
view that all phenomena lack essence. 46  When charged with the consequence of 
metaphysical nihilism, later Mahāyāna Buddhists move to defend the doctrine along two 
divergent streams. The Madhyamaka Buddhists state that the very concept of an ultimate 
reality, being itself an empty concept, entails that only the phenomenal world of conventional 
reality exists. In complete opposition the Yogācāra Buddhists maintain that phenomena do 
not exist at all,47 save for their being the objects of our awareness, which on this view, are not 
in the least bit substantial but are rather cognitive and perceptual constructs.48  
A later Chinese development in the Mahāyāna lineage, Huayan Buddhism, combines 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Garfield, 130. 
41 Taikō Yamasaki, Shingon Japanese Esoteric Buddhism, ed. Yasuyoshi Morimoto and David Kidd, trans. Richard and Cynthia 
Peterson (Boston: Shambala Publications Inc., 1988), 98. 
42 Ibid., 92. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Thomas P. Kasulis , John C. Maraldo James W. Heisig, ed., Japanese Philosophy, ed. Thomas P. Kasulis , John C. Maraldo James 
W. Heisig (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), 71. 
45 Ibid., 57. 
46 Siderits, 138, 139. 
47 Ibid., 144. 
48 Garfield, 73. 
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both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Buddhist philosophy in developing its own view.49 Huayan 
Buddhism teaches that the totality of the cosmos, or the Dharmadhātu,50 is interrelated and 
interdependent, with phenomena and emptiness interpenetrating.51 The Dharmadhātu is 
illustrated through the metaphor of Indra’s net, the net being an intricately complex web of 
relational networks with a jewel at each intersection in which every single other jewel is 
reflected.52 Similarly, each phenomenon, by being constituted of dependence relations, is 
interrelated relative to all other phenomena.53  
Phenomena and emptiness are interdependent since “emptiness is only the 
emptiness of form”, and form “is the way in which emptiness is manifest at a particular 
moment.” 54 Phenomena are also related to each other through their mutual identification 
and mutual penetration. Mutual identification entails that through the fact of their 
emptiness, all phenomena lack difference, 55  and mutual penetration entails that all 
phenomena contain each other, arise simultaneously, and are mutually conditioned and 
conditioning.56  
Kūkai builds upon this Mahāyāna lineage, and takes the universal embodiment of the 
dharma (dharmakâya) as its highest expression. It is “a luminous reality of wisdom and 
compassion that penetrates and embraces all existence such that the dharmakâya is actually 
one’s own innate Buddha-nature”57 One’s Buddha-nature then, is emptiness-as-such as it 
interpenetrates the form that is one’s body. Kūkai’s metaphysics consists of not only the 
traditional five elements in Buddhist cosmology, (earth, water, fire, wind and space), but also 
of a sixth element that permeates all five; mind.58 These six elements constitute the Buddha 
body and mind pervades throughout, such that “Mind is none other than form and form is 
none other than mind. Neither precludes or obstructs the other.”59  
What remained metaphysical in Huayan’s notion of interpenetration has, in Kūkai’s 
view, taken on more of a phenomenological quality; the interpenetration of emptiness and 
form has become an interpenetration of mind and body, where the Buddha’s dharma-body 
“is being perpetually expressed in and as its embodiment in the phenomenal world, in its 
sounds, movements, and forms, and even in the thoughts of sentient beings.”60 As such, the 
realisation of the ninth level of the storehouse consciousness is a non-dual realisation since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid., 76. 
50  Dharmadhātu denotes the realm of truth or the dharmas as they truly are. It also denotes the totality of phenomena. Huayan 
Buddhism teaches that Dharmadhātu is the body of the Vairocana (“Shining Out”) Buddha, the celestial Buddha associated with the 
totality of the cosmos. (Mitchell and Jacoby, 422, 238, 427). 
51 Ibid., 238. 
52 Garfield, 76. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., 77. 
55 Ibid., pg 76 
56 Mitchell and Jacoby, 240. 
57 Ibid., 319. 
58 Thomas P. Kasulis , John C. Maraldo James W. Heisig, ed., Japanese Philosophy, 59. 
59 Ibid., 60. 
60 Krummel, John, "Kûkai", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/kukai/>. Accessed 05 / 10 / 15 
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both form and emptiness are mutually interpenetrating, as are parts and wholes.61 
Yet Kūkai maintains that this level still falls short of fully grasping the truth of non-
duality,62 since it expresses its metaphysical insights through dyadic verbal descriptions. For 
Kūkai, “one can know that reality not by verbally describing it but by directly engaging it,”63 
through unmediated and embodied experiential practice.64 This level of consciousness is the 
“field of one-as-one outside all distinctions,” and is the quintessential expression of non-dual 
reality.65 Since this realisation is grounded on the metaphysics of interpenetration expressed 
in the ninth level, the tenth level of direct participatory realisation is not ontologically beyond 
any of the prior levels but is rather the purity within all prior levels.66  
Pertinently then, the embodied condition is not only validated67 but it is the medium 
whereby non-dual states can be realised.68 The phenomenal world is the embodiment of the 
Buddha’s Dharma body; it is the creative and communicative activity of the truth as realised 
in each sentient being, it is the “imminent presence of the Buddha within, and as the body 
and mind of each and every one of us,” and as such it is directly preaching aspects of the 
Dharma through our every thought and deed.69  
 
8. Towards a Phenomenology of Non-Dyadic Consciousness 
It is important to consider the fact that for phenomenologists, inquiry as to the 
nature of consciousness comes from the first person perspective. Subjective experience is 
the foundational basis for inquiry, but has no ontological status as a feature in the world 
apart from the individual subject. For the Shingon Buddhists, consciousness is ontological, it 
does not require the existence of subjects and objects, since it is the principle that 
permeates all such distinctions and unifies them. Since the universal embodiment of the 
dharma is imminently embodied in all phenomenal thing-events, every phenomenon 
teaches some aspect of the dharma to every other phenomenon.70 It is only by aligning with 
the field of non-dual consciousness in its suchness as it is, beyond all discursive dualism, that 
one may embody the totality of the cosmos. 71 
David Shaner offers a phenomenological account of non-dual awareness in its 
cosmic suchness, as being a pre-reflective and pre-intentional neutral horizon from which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ibid. 
62 Kasulis, et. al. 57. 
63 Ibid. 73. 
64 Krummel. 
65 Kasulis, et. al. 57. 
66 Yamasaki, 93. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Krummel. 
69  Ibid 
70 Ibid. 
71 Kasulis, et. al.  57. 
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experience arises, which he refers to as First Order Bodymind Awareness.72 Since this mode of 
awareness lacks both the noesis and noema constituents, it cannot be subject to analysis 
within the framework of the western phenomenological tradition, which holds that such 
states are not conscious. Shaner’s view is that this problem is overcome in part by stating 
that, “In the first order mode of experience, bodymind is primordially given and is 
experienced as the dynamic ground for all experience.”73 First Order Bodymind Awareness 
cannot be noematically grasped except reflexively, but since this mode of awareness is 
dynamic, any reflexive reflection would automatically be of a prior experiential event.74 The 
mode of experiential awareness for First Order Bodymind Awareness, according to Shaner, 
is “the activity of “presencing” the horizon as it is given to consciousness.”75  
It’s a subtle distinction perhaps but an important one to make; for Kūkai the 
experience of the horizon is not given to consciousness, so much as conscious awareness is 
embodied in it. The individual upon enlightenment realises their Buddha-nature as 
emptiness, which is in seamless continuity with the totality of emptiness-as-such as it 
permeates the entire cosmos. Since this emptiness is the Buddha’s luminous dharma body, 
the tenth level of non-dyadic consciousness entails an expansion of awareness from the 
particular manifestation of the conscious ground in the individual person, to the conscious 
ground that is the cosmic totality. Through the interrelatedness of consciousness and 
embodiment, the empty body, (as a jewel on Indra’s net), is both situated in a spatiotemporal 
point of origin for noesis / noema phenomenal experience, as well as imminently situated in 
non-dual interrelatedness with the cosmos-as-such.  
An enlightened being who has attained this non-dual state of consciousness is 
paradoxically, in a state devoid of both subjectivity and space and time, whilst being 
embodied within space and time. The non-spatiotemporal state is realised when the noesis-
noema dyadic structure collapses, which it does in two instances. Firstly, Shaner emphasises 
that the spatiotemporal dimension of bodymind awareness is located in the point of origin 
from whence intentional experience arises.76 Phenomenologically speaking, he maintains 
that we are “nothing more than the place through which dynamic experience flows.”77 If in 
ordinary perception, we become so focused on the noematic object that we are no longer 
aware of our surroundings or our subjective point of origin, we become detached from the 
experiential horizon and sink into a localised non-dual state.78 Since this state is detached 
from the subjective point of origin however, it is a transient state of non-duality that is 
ungrounded in the place through which experience flows. It is thus an inauthentic temporary 
mode of non-dual awareness, which can do no more than afford us a glimpse of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Shaner, 48. 
73 Ibid., 57. 
74 Ibid., 55. 
75 Ibid., 53. 
76 Ibid., 58. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 60. 
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experiential horizon.  
By contrast the state of non-dual awareness that occurs through the subjective point 
of origin and into the experiential ground of all phenomena is an authentic state. It can be 
understood as the outcome of introspective activities, such as meditation, that detaches 
awareness from the external noematic focus by placing attention on the subjective point of 
origin. Upon realising the emptiness of the subject, this point of origin collapses into 
emptiness-as-such, which as we have seen on Kūkai’s account, can be understood as 
constituting the entire phenomenal horizon.  
Since the subjective point of origin remains a site in the realm of space and time, 
ordinary cognition and interaction with other sentient beings continues. Yet an enlightened 
being, who has come to not only know the emptiness of all phenomena but embody all 
phenomena through emptiness-as-such, shares in the imminent ground of experience, and 
in this way has a heightened sensibility towards the objects of ordinary perception.  
Insofar as we consider embodiment as the state of inhabiting a physical body in a 
spatiotemporal domain however, the notion of embodying the entire experiential horizon 
seems far-fetched at best. The jewel on Indra’s net, even if it were to awaken and see all the 
other jewels upon the inter-related web, could surely not embody the perspective of all those 
other jewels. It also seems unsatisfying to resort to the statement that such an experience is 
ineffable. How can we make sense of what it is like to be enlightened? 
In response, it is important to highlight that Kūkai places an emphasis on 
embodiment as the vehicle for ineffable experience. The claim that an enlightened person 
embodies the cosmic totality is simply the claim that such a person has open access to the 
underlying conscious state of the experiential horizon, which permeates all phenomena. It is 
through that permeation that an enlightened person partakes in the phenomenal experience 
of all sentient beings. Such a person acts in the world from their particularised, embodied 
position as a node or locus of experience, as a jewel on the net. The enlightened experience 
on this view is a state where both dyadic and non-dyadic conscious experience, are 
simultaneously available, but it can only occur through an authentic non-dyadic state.  
This view does of course rely on the Buddhist notion that there exists such an 
underlying experiential horizon, which of course we have no way of determining in a manner 
that would satisfy our epistemic criteria. Kūkai himself states that such experiences cannot be 
known or articulated, but only directly experienced. At the very least the account offers an 
alternative conception of how to think about the phenomenology of consciousness that puts 
pressure on the presupposition that subjectivity and intentional structures are necessary for 
conscious experience. It also offers a metaphysical account of consciousness that is 
grounded in enlightenment phenomenology.  
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